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NOTE

EXPLORING ALTERNATIVES TO THE
“CONSULTATION OR CONSENT”
PARADIGM
Jason Searle*
ABSTRACT
The Dakota Access Pipeline brought the question of what adequate tribal consultation requires to the forefront. Some would argue that consultation is a weak
standard and that only adopting a new standard of free, prior, and informed
consent can guarantee tribes greater control and respect. However, the “consultation or consent” paradigm does not take into account important sources of law
that do not fit under “consultation” or “consent” and yet could be valuable in
strengthening tribes’ claims in the absence of a consent standard.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In its fight against the Dakota Access Pipeline (DAPL), the Standing
Rock Sioux Tribe’s (Standing Rock) earliest legal claims against the United
States Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) included charges that the government failed to fulfill its consultation duties under Section 106 of the
National Historic Preservation Act (NHPA) before approving construction
permits for DAPL.1 NHPA Section 106 establishes a basis for review that
agencies must comply with before pursuing a federal undertaking that could
have an impact on historical or cultural resources.2 Most important to the
tribe’s argument was the portion of Section 106 and its accompanying regulations that require tribal consultation. The U.S. District Court for the
District of Columbia (D.D.C.) ruled for USACE.3 The court’s conclusion
rested in part on the finding that USACE had sufficiently consulted the
tribe.4
It would be fair to say that inadequate consultation describes the United
States’ posture toward tribes since their earliest relations. To many tribes
and scholars, the character of this relationship has not changed greatly with
1.
Standing Rock Sioux Tribe v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 205 F. Supp. 3d 4, 7–10
(D.D.C. 2016).
2.
National Historic Preservation Act § 106, 54 U.S.C. § 306108 (2012); NATIONAL
PARK SERVICE, NATIONAL HISTORIC PRESERVATION ACT SECTION 106: A QUICK GUIDE FOR PRESERVING
NATIVE AMERICAN CULTURAL RESOURCES 1 (2012), https://www.nps.gov/abpp/preservation/compliance/Quick%20Guide_Section106_Battlefields.pdf.
3.
Standing Rock Sioux Tribe, 205 F. Supp. 3d at 7.
4.
Id. at 32–33.

R
R
R
R
R
R
R

\\jciprod01\productn\M\MEA\6-2\MEA204.txt

Spring 2017]

unknown

Seq: 3

An Alternative Paradigm to Tribal Consent

11-JUL-17

14:04

487

the administrative state, and they urge improvement.5 Recently, some
scholars have deemed the existing consultation process as an inadequate
means to secure tribes’ interests in many cases.6 They note that agencies
have often turned consultation into a pro forma box to check, rendering tribal consultation inconsequential.7 Some of these scholars argue that, in order to ensure protection of tribes’ interests, the United States would have to
update its law to recognize the internationally held standard of “free, prior,
and informed consent” (FPIC).8 That standard of consent is thought to
vindicate indigenous peoples’ rights and give them meaningful leverage in
instances where a dominant government’s actions threaten their interests.9
But the United States has not adopted a consent-based standard. Instead, it has flouted the mandate of the United Nations Declaration on the
Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP) and the International Labor Organization (ILO), which require FPIC.10 Further, U.S. domestic law does
not meet consent-based standards.11
Though the United States is unlikely to adopt a consent-based standard
in the near future, tribes are not consigned to the lackluster consultation
standard. This Note argues that promising alternative provisions of law can
be found by deconstructing the “consultation or consent” paradigm and
looking to the primary sources of law on which these concepts rest. Some
of these provisions could be characterized as moving away from consultation
toward consent, but other provisions appear to compel a uniquely powerful
standard that cannot be accurately categorized as either consultation or
consent.
This Note identifies and explores options for applying provisions of law
that can be read as going beyond the current “consultation or consent” para5.
See, e.g., Diana Coronel David, Green Energy in Indian Country as a Double-Edged
Sword for Native Americans: Drawing on the Inter-American and Colombian Legal Systems to
Redefine the Right to Consultation, 38 ENVIRONS: ENVTL. L. & POL’Y J. 223 (2014-2015); Derek C.
Haskew, Federal Consultation with Indian Tribes: The Foundation of Enlightened Policy Decisions,
or Another Badge of Shame?, 24 AM . INDIAN L. REV. 21, 25 (2000).
6.
See David, supra note 5; Robert J. Miller, Consultation or Consent: The United States’
Duty to Confer with American Indian Governments, 91 N.D. L. REV. 37 (2015).
7.
See Haskew, supra note 5, at 25.
8.
See Miller, supra note 6, at 37–38; Cindy S. Woods, The Great Sioux Nation v. the
“Black Snake”: Native American Rights and the Keystone XL Pipeline, 22 BUFF. HUM . RTS. L.
REV. 67, 87–93 (2015-2016); see also Dean B. Suagee & Christopher T. Stearns, Indigenous
Self-Government, Environmental Protection, and the Consent of the Governed: A Tribal Environmental Review Process, 5 COLO. J. INT’L ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 59, 61 (1994).
9.
See Miller, supra note 6, at 37–38; Woods, supra note 8, at 87–93; see also Suagee &
Stearns, supra note 8, at 61.
10.
See Woods, supra note 8, at 87–93; see also CONVENTION CONCERNING INDIGENOUS AND
TRIBAL PEOPLES IN INDEPENDENT COUNTRIES art. 6, June 27, 1989, 1989 I.L.M. 1384.
11.
See Woods, supra note 8, at 87–93.
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digm. Part II identifies strong examples of “alternative paradigm” provisions, found in the NHPA and applicable regulations, such as the
“government-to-government” relationship. This Note demonstrates how
explicitly tying the government-to-government concept to specific legal
provisions could significantly strengthen those provisions to promote tribal
interests. Part II concludes by surveying the primary sources of international law’s standard of consent—FPIC. This Note argues that whether the
United States has an obligation to enforce FPIC is uncertain, and whether
the United States would enforce a consent standard is even less certain. In
light of this, the better option is to seize the advantages of the alternative
paradigm. The alternative paradigm can still achieve many of the aims of
FPIC, and, furthermore, the alternative paradigm consists completely of
U.S. federal law, which unquestionably binds the federal government. Additionally, the alternative paradigm would protect tribal interests more than
consultation does, as it is presently understood.
Part III of this Note analyzes the D.D.C.’s decision denying Standing
Rock’s motion for preliminary injunction. This Note analyzes the decision
under the current framework, that is, under NHPA Section 106 as shaped
by the present, diminished understanding of tribal consultation. The Part
highlights how, even without the alternative paradigm, the D.D.C. could
have favored Standing Rock. On the other hand, Standing Rock and
USACE brought arguments of similar strength under the current understanding of consultation. Given these points, the need for the alternative
paradigm is even greater. I consider how Standing Rock’s case would have
been stronger under the alternative paradigm. The alternative paradigm,
because of its ties to the Indian law canons of construction and tribal preference, would have demanded that the court consider factors other than
agency deference. Finally, I will discuss how administrative bodies, tribes,
and advocates should employ the alternative paradigm going forward.

II. LAW SUPPORTING

AN ALTERNATIVE TO THE “CONSULTATION OR
CONSENT” PARADIGM

A. NHPA Section 106
NHPA Section 106 establishes a regime for review that agencies must
follow early on in any undertaking, such as permitting a pipeline, that could
have an impact on any historic property included in or eligible for inclusion
in the National Register.12 NHPA Section 106 is drafted in a way that
regards tribes as possessing expertise in this area, and as being the best fit to
12.
National Historic Preservation Act, 54 U.S.C. § 306108 (2012); 36 C.F.R. § 800.1
(stating that Section 106 review should start early); 36 C.F.R. § 800.2(c)(2)(ii)(A) (stating
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identify their own properties of historical and cultural significance.13
Against this backdrop, the regulations clearly establish a tribal consultation
requirement.14 But upon further inspection, consultation does not fully describe the extent of an agency’s obligations to tribes. I will elaborate on two
particularly powerful obligations: (1) the duty of agencies to “seek concurrence” with tribes, and (2) the right of tribes at the conclusion of Section 106 review to be signatories to Memorandums of Agreement (MOAs).

1. “Seek Concurrence”
36 C.F.R. § 800.5(c)(2)(iii) is found within a section concerning an
agency’s procedural duties to parties in the “adverse effects” determination
process.15 It provides that “[t]he agency official should seek the concurrence
of any Indian tribe or Native Hawaiian organization that has made known
to the agency official that it attaches religious and cultural significance to a
historic property subject to the finding.”16 The concurrence provision provides a 30-day window for tribes to voice disagreement with an agency’s
finding and request that the Advisory Council on Historic Preservation
(ACHP) review and object to the finding.17 These “concurrence” provisions
are not replicated for any other interest group, which reflects the government’s unique obligation to tribes.18
Section 800.5(c)(2)(iii) requires more than consultation because it demands that agencies “seek concurrence” with tribes’ views. Specifically, the
agency, in making its adverse effects finding, must “seek concurrence” with
an Indian tribe or Native Hawaiian organization that attaches cultural and
religious significance to a property involved.19 The Merriam-Webster Dictionary defines concurrence as “a state of agreeing with someone or somethat agencies should start consulting tribes early on in Section 106 review); see also Exec.
Order No. 13,175, 65 Fed. Reg. 67,249 (Nov. 6, 2000).
13.
See, e.g., 36 C.F.R. §§ 800.4(c)(1) (requiring agency officials to acknowledge tribal
expertise in identifying historic properties), 800.2(c)(2)(i)(A) (allowing the tribe to assume
the responsibilities of the State Historic Preservation Officer), 800.2(c)(2)(ii)(A) (2016) (including a list of tribal functions regarding historic property identification for which the
agency official is to ensure that these attend throughout the review process).
14.
See 36 C.F.R. §§ 800.1–.2 (establishing consultation as an integral part of the Section 106 process, and particularly with respect to tribes as consulting parties, from the beginning of the regulations).
15.
36 C.F.R. § 800.5(c)(2)(iii).
16.
Id.
17.
Id.
18.
See id. Other consulting parties involved in the review process are mentioned in a
parallel provision, Section 800.5(c)(2)(i), without a similar “seek concurrence” requirement,
and no provision in Section 800.5 gives those stakeholders the opportunity to voice disagreement and request ACHP review as is afforded to tribes. 36 C.F.R. § 800.5.
19.
Id.
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thing.”20 This definition, while not provided by the statute or regulations,
indicates that the term “concurrence” means more than mere consultation.21
Then again, the regulations define consultation expansively. Section 800.16
defines consultation as “the process of seeking, discussing, and considering
the views of other participants, and, where feasible, seeking agreement with
them regarding matters arising in the Section 106 process.”22
The part of the “consultation” definition containing the language “seeking agreement” may seem to resemble “seek concurrence” so closely that one
may assume that the latter’s use in a provision mirrors the “seeking agreement” portion of the consultation definition. This is not to say, however,
that just because “seek concurrence” is not used elsewhere that “seeking
agreement” is not a component of consultation. But the use of “seek concurrence” in Section 800.5(c)(2)(iii) emphasizes the importance of “seeking
agreement” for its purposes, whereas seeking agreement in other instances
of consultation arguably depends more on an agency’s discretion concerning
what is “feasible.”
Even though tribes are not guaranteed concurrence, Section 800.5(c)(2)(iii) gives them recourse if they disagree with an agency’s
adverse effects finding.23 This section gives tribes the right to challenge the
process as unfair by bringing in the ACHP as a consulting party and requesting that it review and object to the agency’s finding.24 This provision
incentivizes agencies to take action in favor of tribes, seeking concurrence.
Section 800.5(c)(2)(i) highlights differences between concurrence and
consultation under this section, as it already accounts for the agency’s duty
to consult in making an adverse effects determination.25 While it concerns
the same issue as Section 800.5(c)(2)(iii)—disagreement over the finding of
no adverse effect—Section 800.5(c)(2)(i) applies to any consulting party in
disagreement.26 The “seek concurrence” provision, on the other hand, is an
additional measure specific to dealing with tribes, and it does not concern
mere consultation.27 Assigning Section 800.5(c)(2)(iii) a meaning that is
equivalent to Section 800.5(c)(2)(i) would make both superfluous.
20.
Concurrence, MERRIAM WEBSTER DICTIONARY, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dic
tionary/concurrence (last visited May 8, 2017).
21.
Merriam-Webster defines consultation as simply “listening to the advice of.” Consultation, MERRIAM WEBSTER DICTIONARY, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/consul
tation (last visited May 8, 2017).
22.
36 C.F.R. § 800.16 (2016) (emphasis added).
23.
Id. § 800.5(c)(2)(iii)
24.
Id.
25.
Id. § 800.5(c)(2)(i)
26.
Id.
27.
Id. § 800.5(c)(2)(iii)
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Benefits notwithstanding, a supporter of the traditional paradigm might
criticize Section 800.5 for leaving the ultimate adverse effects determination
to the agency’s discretion.28 Behind this criticism is the lingering skepticism that only consent can make the difference between meaningful tribal
participation and government treating Section 106 review as a hollow, pro
forma requirement. But this position would fail to give Section 800.5 due
credit. First, Section 800.5 reaffirms the theme of Section 106 review as it
concerns tribes—that tribes are to be given an active role throughout the
review process.29 Second, the provision creates grounds for an “arbitrary
and capricious” challenge under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) if
an agency disregards its duties to tribes, which would be an unlawful way to
come to an adverse effects finding.30 This possibility incentivizes the
agency to fulfill its duties meaningfully, as was the case with the provision
allowing a tribe to challenge the agency’s adverse effects finding.31 NHPA
supports an “arbitrary and capricious” challenge because it provides that
tribes are to be consulted in determining eligibility of historic properties for
inclusion in the National Register.32 If a property is deemed eligible for the
National Register, a project altering it must be found to have an adverse
effect.33 But properties significant to a tribe, though not listed in the National Register, can still be hard to fight for, as the DAPL controversy has
illustrated.34 Rather than the “adverse effects” finding, the real concern
may be ensuring that the agency makes a good faith effort to determine the
historical and cultural importance of properties not listed in the National
Register, and which non-Indians might not recognize as historically or culturally important. But as long as the agency follows the law and listens to
tribes, it should be easier to identify previously unrecognized properties of
historical or cultural significance.
Given the agency’s duty to work with tribes on a “government-to-government” basis,35 it makes sense to require concurrence with tribes. These
provisions increase agencies’ accountability to tribes. Many interest groups
are entitled to consultation in the form of having their advice heard by an
28.
See id. § 800.5(b).
29.
See, e.g., id. § 800.2(c)(2)(ii)(B), (c)(2)(i)(A), (c)(2)(ii), (c)(2)(ii)(A).
30.
See Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C § 706(2)(A) (2015); 36 C.F.R.
§ 800.5(a)(1).
31.
36 C.F.R. § 800.5 (2016).
32.
16 U.S.C. § 470a(d)(1)(A) (2015).
33.
36 C.F.R. § 800.5(a)(1).
34.
See generally Standing Rock Sioux Tribe v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 205 F.
Supp. 3d 4 (D.D.C. 2016).
35.
See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 13,175, 65 Fed. Reg. 67,249 (Nov. 6, 2000); 36 C.F.R.
§ 800.2; see also Quechan Tribe of Fort Yuma Indian Reservation v. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, 755 F. Supp. 2d 1104 (S.D. Cal. 2010).
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agency, but under the concurrence provision, only tribes are additionally
entitled to the agency’s good faith effort to integrate their advice into final
agency decisions. “Seeking concurrence” is just one instance of agencies’
additional duties toward tribes.36 These provisions mean that an agency’s
discretion is not absolute, but rather is attended by concrete obligations to
tribes.37

2. The Power of Tribes as MOA Signatories
36 C.F.R. § 800.6(c) is another example of how Section 106 regulations
assign duties beyond consultation. This provision addresses the Memorandum of Agreement (MOA), a document drafted to verify an agency’s compliance with a decision at the end of the Section 106 process.38 Only a
select group of parties are allowed to choose to be signatories to the
MOA.39 These parties typically are the State Historic Preservation Officer
(SHPO), the Tribal Historic Preservation Officer (THPO), ACHP, and
tribes.40 Tribes must be invited by agency officials to be signatories to an
MOA,41 while other consulting groups are eligible to be invited only to
concur with the MOA.42 Further, a tribe can take on the role of the
SHPO,43 and acquire signatory rights in this way. The most significant
power tribes likely have as MOA signatories is the superintending power
under Section 800.6(c)(8).44 Under this provision, any signatory perceiving
that a project is not conforming to the MOA may demand consultation and
even terminate the MOA if not satisfied that the problem is being
remedied.45

B. Government-to-Government Relationship
The government-to-government relationship of the United States with
tribes is another important NHPA Section 106 source that goes beyond
consultation and consent. This relationship is recognized in the U.S. Con36.
See, e.g., 36 C.F.R. §§ 800.6(a) (government-to-government relationship), (c)(3)
(Memorandum of Agreement signatory rights), 800.2(c)(2)(ii)(E) (ability to expand agency
duties to tribes through agreement).
37.
Id. § 800.2(c)(2)(ii)(E).
38.
Id. § 800.6(c)(2).
39.
Id. § 800.2(c).
40.
Id. § 800.6(c).
41.
Id. § 800.6(c)(2)(ii).
42.
Id. § 800.6(c)(3).
43.
Id. § 800.2(c)(2)(i)(A). The SHPO represents the public’s interests in cultural and
historical preservation. Id. § 800.2(c)(1)(i).
44.
Id. § 800.6(c)(8).
45.
Id.
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stitution and has been developed in executive orders, statutory regulations,
and case law in order to reaffirm the importance of the United States’ respect for individuated tribal sovereignty.46 But the government-to-government concept also triggers substantive rights.47 The reason the
government-to-government concept has not been distinguished from consultation and highlighted for its independent power, may be that it often
appears alongside the duty of consultation, and could even be wrongly conflated with it.48 But consultation is just a piece of the government-to-government relationship picture. The difference between consultation and a
government-to-government relationship is clear from executive statements
and orders since the Clinton Administration, NHPA regulations, and case
law.49

1. Executive Order 13,175 and Other Executive Materials
Executive Order 13,175 (E.O. 13,175 or Order), issued by President
Clinton in 2000,50 is one of the most significant sources of executive support for both consultation and government-to-government relations. Prior
scholarship identifies that E.O. 13,175 imposes consultation requirements
on NHPA and NEPA.51 But the Order also emphasizes the governmentto-government relationship between the United States and tribes to impose
independent conditions on all laws affecting tribes.52 The Order followed a
1994 memo President Clinton wrote concerning tribal relations.53 Many of
the memo’s principles also appear in E.O. 13,175, such as acknowledging the
United States’ unique, government-to-government relationship with tribes,
46.
See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 13,175, 65 Fed. Reg. 67,249 (Nov. 6, 2000); 36 C.F.R.
§ 800.2(c)(4), (f)(1).
47.
Kirk Johnson, Old Treaties and New Alliances Empower Native Americans, N.Y.
TIMES (Nov. 15, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/16/us/old-treaties-and-new-alli
ances-empower-native-americans.html?_r=0. Though it does not use the terminology, the
note discusses how the “government-to-government” concept is being used to invoke treaty
rights. Id.
48.
See, e.g., Motion for Preliminary Injunction Request for Expedited Hearing, Standing Rock Sioux Tribe v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 205 F. Supp. 3d 4 (D.D.C. 2016) (No.
1:16-cv-1534-JEB), 2016 WL 4445382.
49.
See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 13,175, 65 Fed. Reg. 67,249 (Nov. 6, 2000); 36 C.F.R.
§ 800.6; Quechan Tribe of Fort Yuma Indian Reservation v. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, 755
F. Supp. 2d 1104, 1104 (S.D. Cal. 2010).
50.
Exec. Order No. 13,175, 65 Fed. Reg. 67,249 (Nov. 6, 2000).
51.
Woods, supra note 8, at 79–82.
52.
See Exec. Order No. 13,175, 65 Fed. Reg. 67,249 (Nov. 6, 2000).
53.
Memorandum on Government-to-Government Relations with Native American
Tribal Governments, 59 Fed. Reg. 22,951 (Apr. 29, 1994) (setting out “principles that executive departments and agencies . . . are to follow in their interactions with American tribal
governments”).

R

\\jciprod01\productn\M\MEA\6-2\MEA204.txt

494

unknown

Seq: 10

Michigan Journal of Environmental & Administrative Law

11-JUL-17

14:04

[Vol. 6:2

and the requirement to conduct “consultation [with tribes] to the greatest
extent.”54 The Order’s distinction between “government-to-government”
and “consultation” frames the alternative paradigm.
Executive Order 13,175 supports the alternative paradigm because it establishes consultation as a subordinate requirement of the government-togovernment relationship. While the Order was primarily issued to establish
greater consultation and coordination with tribes (as indicated by its title),
the phrases “government-to-government” and “consultation” are used in
ways that clarify the distinction between them.55 The preamble to the Order states its purpose in part to be, “to strengthen the United States government-to-government relationship with Indian tribes.”56 In the same
sentence, establishing “regular and meaningful consultation” is mentioned,
but is separated by a comma in a list of purposes.57 Further, Section 2(a) of
the Order recognizes the unique trust relationship is a fundamental principle that flows from the government-to-government relationship established
by the U.S. Constitution, treaties, statutes, executive orders, and case law.58
It is from this government-to-government relationship that the duty to consult tribes arises.59
In Section 3, where the criteria for policymaking are set out, E.O.
13,175 also defines the implications of the government-to-government relationship that stretch beyond consultation.60 The criteria include delegating
to tribes “the maximum administrative discretion possible.”61 Most relevant
to DAPL is Section 3(c), establishing the federal government’s obligations
when it implements policies that have “tribal implications.”62 The government must solicit tribes for their own policies, and “where possible, defer to
Indian tribes to establish standards.”63 This duty seems to go above and
beyond consultation, even nearing consent. Section 3(c) also mentions consultation and because it is mentioned separately from the other duties, it
must be a distinct concept.64 Further, because consultation is a sub-provision in relation to the government-to-government provision giving rise to
54.
Id.; see Exec. Order No. 13,175, 65 Fed. Reg. 67,249 (Nov. 6, 2000).
55.
Exec. Order No. 13,175, 65 Fed. Reg. 67,249 (Nov. 6, 2000).
56.
Id.
57.
Id.
58.
Id. § 2(a).
59.
Id. § 3. This section says that certain “responsibilities” arise from the special relationship between the U.S. and tribes, and then goes on to mention tribal consultation as one
of those responsibilities. Id.
60.
Id.
61.
Id. § 3(b).
62.
Id. § 3(c).
63.
Id. § 3(c)(2).
64.
Id. § 3(c)(3).
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certain responsibilities, consultation must be a component of governmentto-government relations.65
The Obama Administration reaffirmed tribal sovereignty and the government-to-government relationship championed by the Clinton Administration.66 It even implied greater agency obligations and protections for
tribes, and maintained the distinction between consultation and government-to-government relations.67 Just before the D.D.C. denied Standing
Rock’s motion for preliminary injunction in September of 2016, the Departments of Justice, the Interior, and the Army wrote a letter to tribes inquiring (1) how the federal government could better consult tribes within the
current statutory scheme, and (2) what legislation might better promote the
government-to-government relationship and consultation requirements.68
Additionally, after the D.D.C. denied Standing Rock’s motion for preliminary injunction, the Obama Administration halted DAPL construction
pending the D.C. Circuit’s evaluation of the case.69 The Obama Administration continued to monitor the case and remained attuned to the tribe’s
sovereign interests.70 The Administration even temporarily stayed approval
of the permit to cross the Missouri River near the Standing Rock reservation so that alternate routes could be considered.71

2. NHPA and NHPA Section 106 Regulations—Explicit
and Implicit References to the Government-toGovernment Relationship
NHPA Section 106 and its accompanying regulations also distinguish
government-to-government relations and consultation.
65.
See also id. § 5(a) (providing consultation greater, exclusive treatment).
66.
See Exec. Order No. 13,647, 78 Fed. Reg. 39,539 (July 1, 2013) (establishing the
White House Council on Native American Affairs).
67.
Id. § 1 (discussing areas of development that the new counsel must promote in
tribal communities).
68.
Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Joint Statement from the Department of Justice, the
Department of the Army and the Department of the Interior Regarding Standing Rock Sioux
Tribe v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (Sept. 9, 2016), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/jointstatement-department-justice-department-army-and-department-interior-regardingstanding.
69.
Obama Steps in With Major Action Halting Dakota Access Pipeline, INDIANZ.COM (Sept.
9, 2016), http://www.indianz.com/News/2016/09/09/obama-steps-in-with-major-actionhalting.asp.
70.
Caitlin Yilek, Obama: We’re Examining Options to ‘Reroute’ ND Pipeline, THE HILL
(Nov. 1, 2016), http://thehill.com/blogs/blog-briefing-room/energy-environment/303912obama-were-examining-ways-to-reroute-the-nd.
71.
Gregor Aisch & K.K. Rebecca Lai, The Conflicts Along 1,172 Miles of the Dakota
Access Pipeline, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 20, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2016/11/
23/us/dakota-access-pipeline-protest-map.html?_r=1.
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NHPA directly affirms government-to-government duties.72 Section 101(c)(2) allows a tribe to take on the role of the SHPO.73 Section 101(d)(6)(A) states that properties of traditional religious or cultural
importance to an Indian tribe or Native Hawaiian organization may be considered eligible for inclusion in the National Register.74 And the next provision states that an agency shall consult about National Register eligibility
with Indian tribes or Native Hawaiian organizations who consider a property to be of traditional religious or cultural importance.75 Section 110(a)(2)—concerning the requirement for each agency to establish a
preservation program to identify, evaluate, and nominate sites for the National Register of Historic Places, and to protect historic properties—mandates in subpart (D) that each agency consult “other Federal, State, and
local agencies, Indian tribes, Native Hawaiian organizations.”76 Grouping
tribes with government-status entities, rather than with other groups who
might simply be entitled to consultation, emphasizes that tribes have
greater Section 106 power than other interest groups.77
NHPA regulations flesh out government-to-government responsibilities even further. 36 C.F.R. § 800.2, defining the participants in the Section 106 review, identifies consulting parties in subpart (c), and implies the
government-to-government relationship.78 It explains how tribes may assume the position of the SHPO, creates the THPO for the special benefit
of tribes, and specifies how the presence or absence of these figures changes
how an agency must communicate with a tribe.79 The regulation requires
agencies to be attentive of the unique relationship between the United
States and tribes, and another mandates that consultation be conducted in a
government-to-government manner.80 These designations are exclusive to
tribes, and they are presented in a section that defines the fundamental
characteristics, standing, and prerogatives of consulting groups.81 Other
consulting parties—including local governments and the public at large—are
72.
National Historic Preservation Act §§ 101(c)(2), (d)(6)(A), 110(a)(2), 54 U.S.C.
§§ 302504, 302706(b), 306102(b)(4) (2012).
73.
Id. § 302702.
74.
Id. § 302706(a).
75.
Id. § 302706(b).
76.
Id. § 306102(b)(4).
77.
Id. § 306102. In fact, other consultation groups are mentioned nowhere in this
section.
78.
36 C.F.R. § 800.2(c) (2016).
79.
Id.
80.
Id. § 800.2(c)(2)(ii)(B)–(C).
81.
See id. § 800.2.
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mentioned in separate provisions, and without the same level of duty attached as is to tribes.82
NHPA and its regulations confirm that the government-to-government
standard includes much more than consultation. Jumping immediately to
arguments about the adequacy of consultation ignores the fact that the law
requires more for tribes than consultation, which is afforded to many interest groups. Further, important provisions included in the government-togovernment framework may be overlooked. Indeed, USACE’s own summary of the permitting process, with de minimis mention of the role of
tribes in the process, suggests that USACE operates under the false impression that a tribe is simply another consulting party.83 The document referred to begins, “[t]he Permit Process consists of a number of steps
involving the applicant, the Corps of Engineers, public and/or private organizations, and Federal, state and/or local agencies.”84 Tribes are not mentioned in
this passage.85 In fact, the word “tribe” appears only twice in the document,
both times in discussing how the Clean Water Act may apply.86 In
USACE’s explanation of pre-application consultations, tribes are not mentioned at all, even though they are supposed to be consulted as early as
possible in the review process.87 However, the document dedicates a substantial segment to public involvement.88 In its short mention of NHPA
and Section 106 review, the document mentions the THPO, but only to say
that it and the SHPO may “review and comment” on certain permits.89
This document demonstrates how extensive the slippage is when the government-to-government relationship is ignored.
To overcome ignorance of duties owed tribes, like that exhibited in
USACE’s permitting document, a firmer commitment to the governmentto-government relationship is necessary. When the government-to-government concept is recognized as a legal foundation, so too are fundamental
obligations, including consultation. Under that paradigm, consultation be82.
See id. § 800.2(d) (concerning the public, members of which are entitled to receive
information about undertakings on historic properties and to provide comments). This entitlement affords much less of a role than tribes enjoy. Id.
83.
See U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENG’RS, U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS PERMITTING PROCESS
INFORMATION, http://www.lrl.usace.army.mil/Portals/64/docs/regulatory/Permitting/
PermittingProcessInformation.pdf.
84.
Id. at 1 (emphasis added).
85.
Id.
86.
Id. at 5, 9.
87.
See, e.g., Te-Moak Tribe of Western Shoshone v. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, 608
F.3d 592, 608–09 (9th Cir. 2010); Quechan Tribe of Fort Yuma Indian Reservation v. U.S.
Dep’t of the Interior, 755 F. Supp. 2d 1104, 1121 (S.D. Cal. 2010); 36 C.F.R. § 800.1.
88.
See U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENG’RS, supra note 83.
89.
Id. at 5.
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comes a more important process with respect to tribes than to other interest
groups, and the understanding that tribes are owed a higher degree and
quality of consultation is recognized.

3. Government-to-Government and Other Alternative
Paradigm Concepts in Case Law
Standing Rock’s counsel heavily relied on Quechan Tribe v. Department
of Interior to show that agencies must give tribes consultation of the highest
quality.90 But Quechan Tribe also employs many alternative paradigm concepts to suggest that the U.S. relationship with tribes stands for more than
high-quality tribal consultation.
In Quechan Tribe, a tribe sought a preliminary injunction against the
Department of Interior (DOI) and the Bureau of Land Management
(BLM) decision to enjoin approval of a solar energy project on the grounds
that the agencies failed to adequately consult the tribe.91
The court highlighted that Section 106 tribal consultation is more than
“an empty formality,” and is an obligation to be conducted in a way that
recognizes the “government-to-government relationship between the Federal Government and Indian tribes.”92 Additionally, the court cited the
Ninth Circuit decision Pit River Tribe v. United States Forest Service for the
proposition that agencies have a fiduciary duty to tribes, noting that “at a
minimum [this fiduciary duty] means agencies must comply with general
regulations and statutes.”93 This fiduciary duty is part of the “unique relationship” between the United States and tribes, and it is not one that is
enjoyed by ordinary interest groups owed consultation.94
The court reaffirmed the government-to-government relationship and
how it strengthens agencies’ duty to consult.95 It noted specific duties agencies have and privileges of tribes that follow the government-to-government
relationship and are required under NHPA.96 These include early tribal
consultation on the most important issues—such as tribal authority to challenge an agency’s contrary finding of National Register eligibility—and the
90.
See Motion for Preliminary Injunction Request for Expedited Hearing, supra note
48, at 20–23.
91.
Quechan Tribe, 755 F. Supp. 2d at 1106–08. The tribe also argued that the agency’s
analysis was flawed, but the Court focused on the inadequate consultation claim, finding it
most compelling. Id. at 1107–08.
92.
Id. at 1108–09 (citing 36 C.F.R. § 800.2(c)(2)(ii)(A)).
93.
Id. at 1110 (citing Pit River Tribe v. U.S. Forest Serv., 469 F.3d 768, 788 (9th Cir.
2006)).
94.
Id. at 1109–10 (citing 36 C.F.R. § 800.2).
95.
Id. at 1108–09.
96.
Id. at 1108–10.
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“special consideration” of consulting tribes.97 The court held that consultation of one tribe does not relieve the agency of consulting another.98
As to consultation, the court said:
[w]hile public informational meetings, consultations with individual tribal members, meetings with government staff or contracted
investigators, and written updates are obviously a helpful and necessary part of the process, they don’t amount to the type of “government-to-government” consultation contemplated by the
regulations. This is particularly true because the Tribe’s government’s requests for information and meetings were frequently
rebuffed or responses were extremely delayed as BLM-imposed
deadlines loomed or passed.99
The court also confirmed that mere “contact” with a tribe does not constitute consultation according to 36 C.F.R. § 800.5(c)(2)(ii).100 The court
emphasized that a government-to-government relationship requires more
than procedural consultation.101 Instead, tribal consultation requires meaningful interaction, which integrates tribal views into decisions.102
In order for the higher standard of consultation and duties to tribes to
be controlling, courts would need to recognize that the higher standard is
plainly apparent in NHPA and regulations, and would need to appreciate
the effect that the government-to-government relationship has. The
D.D.C. did not do this in considering Standing Rock’s case. Further,
courts, administrators, and litigators interpreting Section 106 need to reconsider their understanding of the statute, and recognize the duties to tribes
beyond consultation. The government-to-government concept is one of the
strongest alternatives to the old paradigm, and its application would greatly
benefit tribes. The government-to-government concept would increase the
value and rigor of consultation, while supporting many other obligations,
including the recognition of tribes’ unique position among consulting
parties.

97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.

Id.
Id. at 1112.
Id. at 1119.
Id. at 1118–19.
Id. at 1118.
See id.
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C. International Law—Strengths, Weaknesses, and the
Alternative Paradigm’s Solution
Some scholars pushing for a consent-based standard jettison domestic
law because they perceive domestic law as centered around weakened consultation.103 They identify significant sources of international law that
should bind the United States to the FPIC standard in dealing with
tribes.104 Some of these international legal sources of FPIC may be enforceable indirectly; for example, the United States’ membership in the
ILO.105 Others, such as the UNDRIP, are less certain to bind the United
States at all.106
Even if these sources were legally binding, they are not enforceable
under U.S. domestic law. But they remain persuasive reminders to the
United States of its international obligations to honor the FPIC standard.
Meanwhile, the alternative paradigm is organic to domestic law, and can
still achieve many of the goals of FPIC.

1. Direct but Ignored—Membership in the ILO
One of the most direct and significant legal obligations on the United
States to honor the FPIC standard is its membership in the ILO.107 The
ILO has been a champion of indigenous peoples’ rights and a proponent of
the utmost respect for and duty-recognition toward indigenous peoples
since its formation in 1989.108 As a member, the United States is legally
bound to these standards. But, as DAPL illustrates, the U.S. has not always
honored those obligations.
Though it is a leading member, the United States has ratified only 14 of
the ILO’s 189 treaties.109 One of the ILO treaties that the United States
103.
See, e.g., Miller, supra note 6, at 37; Suagee & Stearns, supra note 8, at 61; Woods,
supra note 8, at 67.
104.
See, e.g., Miller, supra note 6, at 37; Suagee & Stearns, supra note 8, at 61; Woods,
supra note 8, at 67.
105.
International Labour Organization, Alphabetical List of ILO Member Countries,
ABOUT THE ILO, http://www.ilo.org/public/english/standards/relm/country.htm (last visited
May 8, 2017).
106.
Woods, supra note 8, at 89.
107.
INT’L LABOUR ORG., The U.S.: A Leading Role in the ILO, ABOUT THE ILO, http://
www.ilo.org/washington/ilo-and-the-united-states/the-usa-leading-role-in-the-ilo/lang—en/
index.htm (last visited May 8, 2017).
108.
See Lisl Brunner & Karla Quintana, The Duty to Consult in the Inter-American System: Legal Standards after Sarayaku, INSIGHTS, Nov. 28, 2012, https://www.asil.org/insights/
volume/16/issue/35/duty-consult-inter-american-system-legal-standards-after-sarayaku.
109.
See Int’l Labour Org., Ratification for United States, RATIFICATION BY COUNTRY, http://
www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=NORMLEXPUB:11200:0::NO::P11200_COUNTRY_
ID:102871 (last visited May 8, 2017).

R
R
R
R

R

\\jciprod01\productn\M\MEA\6-2\MEA204.txt

Spring 2017]

unknown

Seq: 17

11-JUL-17

An Alternative Paradigm to Tribal Consent

14:04

501

has not ratified is the Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention (ITPC).110
The United States’ refusal to ratify the ITPC may be due to the fact that it
gives indigenous groups rights to their lands, and defines “lands,” as including even those lands that indigenous people merely “use.”111 This definition
could be interpreted as giving tribes rights to their ancestral lands, beyond
reservation boundaries that the United States has established. Being accountable to an international forum through ratification of the ITPC may
raise concerns for the United States because of the impact it would have on
the United States’ management of the trust relationship.

2. Significant but Not Mandatory—UNDRIP
The UNDRIP establishes the FPIC standard in international law.112
But the UNDRIP’s authority for any nation critically depends on whether
it has ratified the treaty.113 At the time the U.N. General Assembly
adopted the UNDRIP in 2007, 143 countries supported approval of the
treaty, and only four did not.114 The United States was among the four that
did not,115 although it later conditionally signed the UNDRIP in response
to pressures from the international community.116 In doing so, it maintained that the instrument was not legally binding and that a consultation
standard would remain law.117 These conditions demonstrate the United
States’ wariness to move from a consultation standard to one based on
consent.
110.
See Int’l Labour Org., Ratification of C169 – Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention,
1989 (No. 169), RATIFICATION BY CONVENTION, http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=NORM
LEXPUB:11300:0::NO:11300:P11300_INSTRUMENT_ID:312314:NO (last visited May 8,
2017).
111.
INT’L LABOUR STANDARDS DEP ’T, INT’L LABOUR ORG., UNDERSTANDING THE INDIGENOUS AND
TRIBAL PEOPLES CONVENTION, 1989 (NO. 169) 21 (2013), http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/
public/—-ed_norm/—-normes/documents/publication/wcms_205225.pdf.
112.
See G.A. Res. 61/295, Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (Sept. 13,
2007), http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/unpfii/documents/DRIPS_en.pdf; see also Saramaka
People v. Suriname, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Inter-Am. Ct.
H.R. (ser. C) No. 172 (Nov. 28, 2007); Sarayaku v. Ecuador, Merits and Reparations, InterAm. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 245 (June 27, 2012).
113.
See JEFFREY DUNOFF ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW: NORMS, ACTORS, PROCESS: A PROBLEMORIENTED APPROACH 60–61 (4th ed. 2015).
114.
Press Release, United Nations General Assembly, General Assembly Adopts Declaration on Rights of Indigenous Peoples; ‘Major Step Forward’ Towards Human Rights for
All, Says President, U.N. Press Release GA/10612 (Sept. 13, 2007), http://www.un.org/
press/en/2007/ga10612.doc.htm.
115.
Id.
116.
Woods, supra note 8, at 88–89.
117.
Id.
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Two international judicial decisions—Saramaka v. Suriname and
Sarayaku v. Ecuador—analyze some of the UNDRIP’s most important provisions. Possible enforcement of those provisions may have caused the United
States’ wariness about ratifying the UNDRIP.
In Saramaka v. Suriname, the Inter-American Commission on Human
Rights (ICHR) alleged that the state of Suriname had violated the
Saramaka People’s rights by, inter alia, failing to adopt “effective measures
to recognize their right to the use and enjoyment of the territory they have
traditionally occupied and used.”118 The court found that Suriname was
bound to the FPIC standard based on the UNDRIP.119 The court first
noted that Suriname had recently supported the approval of the UNDRIP
by the U.N. General Assembly.120 Article 32.2 of the UNDRIP requires
signatories to obtain FPIC of indigenous peoples that may be affected by
“the approval of any project affecting their lands or territories and other
resources particularly in connection with the development, utilization or
exploitation of mineral, water, or other resources.”121 The court found that
consultation was required, and explained that because Suriname had approved the UNDRIP and was carrying out a large-scale development that
would have a major impact within the Saramaka territory—i.e., the taking of
land the tribe had traditionally used—Suriname had a duty to obtain the
Saramaka People’s FPIC.122 Because Suriname had not met this duty, the
ICHR held that it violated the UNDRIP.123
Applying Article 32.2 of the UNDRIP as Saramaka did would significantly impact the United States’ obligations if the United States had fully
ratified the UNDRIP. Instead, the United States remains unbound by Article 32.2’s requirements despite having “endorsed” the UNDRIP in
2010.124 The conditional ratification rendered the UNDRIP completely
unable to hold the United States to FPIC, even in international forums, and
left the United States with essentially unchanged commitments to tribes.
118.
Saramaka People v. Suriname, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations, and
Costs, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 172, at 2 (Nov. 28, 2007). Saramaka is interesting
on one count because, although it relied greatly on UNDRIP, it also considered Suriname’s
membership in the ILO, even though it had not ratified ITPC, as a significant factor in
requiring FPIC. Id. at 27. By extension, the court would consider the United States bound
to FPIC by virtue of its ILO membership. Id.
119.
Id. at 39.
120.
Id.
121.
Id.
122.
See id. at 39–41. The court did not say that Suriname had signed the UNDRIP,
however, it considered Suriname bound because of its show of support within the context of
many other instances to suggest that FPIC has become an international norm. Id.
123.
See id. at 40.
124.
Woods, supra note 8, at 89–90.

R

\\jciprod01\productn\M\MEA\6-2\MEA204.txt

Spring 2017]

unknown

Seq: 19

An Alternative Paradigm to Tribal Consent

11-JUL-17

14:04

503

Sarayaku v. Ecuador also endorses FPIC. In Sarayaku, the ICHR
charged Ecuador with failing to consult the Sarayaku People before granting oil concessions in a contract with an Argentinian oil company.125 The
ICHR held that Ecuador had failed to properly consult the Sarayaku People, in violation of its duty to do so under the UNDRIP, which it had
approved in 2007.126 However, the ICHR also made important observations about consent and its relationship to adequate consultation.127
Thorough discussion about consent in Sarayaku was unnecessary because consultation—a precursor to consent—did not occur, so the question
of consent was not before the court.128 Nonetheless, the ICHR still addressed consent by acknowledging that the project Ecuador approved in this
case was to be a large-scale development with significant impacts on the
Sarayaku People.129 Relying on Saramaka, the ICHR found that Ecuador’s
obligations included not only consultation, but also the Sarayaku People’s
FPIC.130 If pro forma consultation had been performed, consent would have
been an issue, and thus the court’s discussion clarified what consent could
require under just slightly different circumstances.
Saramaka and Sarayaku acknowledge that under the UNDRIP, FPIC is
a fundamental right owed to indigenous peoples.131 The United States has
been hesitant to accept FPIC as binding. But even without recognition of
FPIC in domestic law, FPIC’s goals can still be achieved through the alternative paradigm. The alternative paradigm would achieve the central purpose of FPIC—ensuring tribes’ rights to self-govern and be shown respect.

3. Advantages of Embracing the Alternative Paradigm Over
International Standards
The alternative paradigm offers two benefits over international norms:
(1) enforceability, and (2) the alternative paradigm’s unique benefits
grounded in the development of the United States’ relationship with tribes.
On enforceability, international law carries less force than domestic law
in U.S. courts, and in many cases is not binding. For example, the UNDRIP, because it is simply a General Assembly Resolution, is a non-bind125.
Brunner & Quintana, supra note 108.
126.
Id.; United Nations General Assembly, supra note 114.
127.
Brunner & Quintana, supra note 108.
128.
Id.
129.
Id. at 39.
130.
Id.
131.
See Saramaka People v. Suriname, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations,
and Costs, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 172 (Nov. 28, 2007); see also Sarayaku v. Ecuador, Merits and Reparations, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 245, at 2 (June 27, 2012).
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ing instrument.132 Further, United States courts interpreting duties and
obligations to tribes look to principles of Federal Indian law, and rarely
consult international law.
The alternative paradigm might also provide a gateway for incorporating international norms in U.S. law. As an example, recall the duty under
NHPA Section 106 review to “seek concurrence” with a tribe that disagrees
with an agency’s finding of “no adverse effects.”133 This provision to seek
concurrence falls under the alternative paradigm. It has independent value
because it demands that the agency do more than seek the tribe’s advice
through consultation.134 It also maps on to international law; specifically,
the ITPC’s General Policy 6(2) instructs that consultations be conducted
“with the objective of achieving agreement or consent to the proposed measures.”135 The case for seeking concurrence generally is strong if one pairs
the fact that the United States is a significantly-contributing member of the
ILO with the knowledge that domestic law requires agreement with tribes
be sought in in some instances, such as in making adverse effects determinations.136 By tying international standards and domestic law, United States
courts may be more willing to apply those provisions that comport with
international standards. The alternative paradigm provides provisions to do
so.137
On the other hand, looking only to apply international standards might
exclude many of the advantages of domestic law. These advantages include
the United States’ fiduciary duty to tribes, the government-to-government
relationship, and the right of tribes to significantly participate in agency
review processes.138 Because international law only recently recognized indigenous peoples’ rights, the international legal relationship to indigenous
peoples has yet to evolve in ways that the United States’ relationship with
tribes has.

132.
Woods, supra note 8, at 87.
133.
36 C.F.R. § 800.5(c), (c)(2)(iii) (2015).
134.
Id.
135.
CONVENTION CONCERNING INDIGENOUS AND TRIBAL PEOPLES IN INDEPENDENT COUNTRIES
art. 6(2), June 27, 1989, 1989 I.L.M. 1384.
136.
Int’l Labour Org., ILO Washington, ABOUT THE ILO, http://www.ilo.org/washington
(last visited Apr. 19, 2017); see 36 C.F.R. § 800.5.
137.
See infra Section III.
138.
See e.g., Quechan Tribe of Fort Yuma Indian Reservation v. U.S. Dep’t of the
Interior, 755 F. Supp. 2d 1104, 1110 (S.D. Cal. 2010); 36 C.F.R. §§ 800.2, 800.6(c).
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III. DAPL PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION: ANALYSIS AND THE
ALTERNATIVE PARADIGM
This Part considers the D.D.C.’s denial of Standing Rock’s motion for
preliminary injunction against DAPL. This section first analyzes the case
under the current understanding NHPA Section 106, with a focus on consultation. The D.D.C. found for the agency on these terms, but the case
could have come out for Standing Rock.139 The D.D.C.’s failure to find for
the tribe demonstrates the need for additional measures, such as the alternative paradigm, to secure tribes’ interests. This Part then discusses how the
alternative paradigm would have helped Standing Rock’s case. This Part
also suggests ideas for future administrative actors, tribes and litigators to
utilize the alternative paradigm going forward.

A. How D.D.C. Could Have Found for Standing Rock on the
Current Understanding of Section 106 Review’s
Requirements
Current understandings of Section 106 review notwithstanding, D.D.C.
could have found for Standing Rock by properly evaluating the required
scope of agency review. Under NHPA, the required scope of agency review
is determined by asking how much “control and responsibility” an agency
has over the impact of a project.140 This term of art determines whether an
agency should be accountable for indirect effects of a project over which the
agency formally has only partial permitting power. D.D.C. should have
found that the entirety of DAPL was within USACE’s control and responsibility, which by consequence would have meant that USACE failed to fulfill
its obligations to the tribe.

1. “Control and Responsibility” and its Meaning Under
NWP 12
An adequate consultation for NHPA purposes must set the appropriate
scope for an agency’s Section 106 review.141 Scope sets the parameters of
the project for the purposes of agency review responsibilities, which in turn
determines the extent to which a tribe will be consulted to identify historic
and cultural sites, as well as to evaluate a project’s affect on them.142 In the
Standing Rock case, the question of scope focused on whether the review
139.
(D.D.C.
140.
141.
142.

See Standing Rock Sioux Tribe v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 205 F. Supp. 3d 4
2016).
See 33 C.F.R. pt. 325, App. B (7)(b)(2) (1990).
See 36 C.F.R. § 800.4.
Id.
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process needed to consider the effects of the entire pipeline (entire project
analysis), or whether the agency could only be required to review those
parts of the project that required permit verification.143 NHPA regulations
require an entire project analysis if a permit is so essential to a project’s
completion that it could be said that the agency issuing the permit has
determinative power over its completion; for example, where a large portion
of the project requires permitting.144 The Standing Rock tribe argued that
USACE had control and responsibility over the entire pipeline because
NHPA defines the potential effect of an undertaking to include the indirect
effects of the permitted activity on historic properties.145 However, the
D.D.C. held the tribe was “miss[ing] the mark” because USACE’s regulations only designate control and responsibility as existing for the limited
portions of a project requiring permitting or approval.146 The D.D.C. concluded that since USACE never had authority to regulate the entire pipeline, it also was not responsible for considering the effects of the entire
pipeline.147 The court compared Sierra Club v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers,
where the D.D.C. found USACE was not responsible for conducting a
NEPA analysis for an entire pipeline, particularly for portions not subject
to federal control or permitting.148
As a threshold matter, it is important to consider factors implicating
the scope of review. Here, DAPL was authorized under Nation-Wide Permit 12 (NWP 12).149 NWP 12 was issued in 2012.150 NWP 12 permits are
general permits for utility line construction that allow a permittee to construct wherever the permit applies without notifying USACE, unless the
specific site requires a “Pre-Construction Notification” (PCN) or “verification.”151 PCNs and verifications trigger site-specific NHPA analyses
points.152 Analysis is deferred until a permittee seeks to build where the
PCN or verification applies.153 Alternatives to general permits are individual permits, which are often required for specific projects, and which require review of the entire project that the permit would allow.154 NWP 12
allows for utility line crossings where no more than half of an acre of juris143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.

Standing Rock Sioux Tribe, 205 F. Supp. 3d at 30–32.
33 C.F.R. pt. 325, app. B (7)(b).
Standing Rock Sioux Tribe, 205 F. Supp. 3d at 30–31.
Id. at 31.
Id. at 31–32.
Id. at 31.
Id. at 27.
Id.
Id. at 11.
Id.
Id. at 29–30.
Sierra Club v. U.S. Army Corp of Eng’rs, 803 F.3d 31, 38 (D.C. Cir. 2015).

\\jciprod01\productn\M\MEA\6-2\MEA204.txt

Spring 2017]

unknown

Seq: 23

11-JUL-17

An Alternative Paradigm to Tribal Consent

14:04

507

dictional waters will be affected at a given crossing.155 DAPL’s water crossings were covered under the NWP 12 because construction at each crossing
was predicted to affect no more than half of an acre of jurisdictional waters.156 Further, USACE did not consider the effects of the entire pipeline
because much of it was covered by the NWP 12 and therefore not subject to
PCN or verification.157
This permitting framework was central to D.D.C.’s decision, as the
court’s analysis indicated that NWP 12s and PCNs made it easier to defer to
USACE’s decision to ignore the effects of the entire project.158 The court
reasoned that construction at many sites was peremptorily, unconditionally
authorized.159 The D.D.C. repeatedly indicated that one of the biggest reasons for not taking a wider scope was because the NWP 12 was authorizing
a pipeline for which a large portion was planned to be built on private
lands.160 Under NWP 12, USACE’s review also ignored the effects that
eventually running crude oil through the pipeline would have.161 Although
pumping crude oil might be viewed as a “reasonably foreseeable environmental effect” of permitting pipeline construction,162 the Standing Rock
case demonstrates that NWP 12 allows USACE to ignore such effects.163

2. Control and Responsibility
Aside from the NWP 12/PCN issue, the parties argued about how the
question of scope relates to control and responsibility alone. Though the
D.D.C. did not cite it directly, 33 C.F.R. pt. 325, Appendix B (7)(b) establishes the “control and responsibility” standard and loosely defines it. It
states:
The district engineer is considered to have control and responsibility for portions of the project beyond the limits of Corps jurisdiction where the Federal involvement is sufficient to turn an
essentially private action into a Federal action. These are cases
155.
Standing Rock Sioux Tribe, 205 F. Supp. 3d at 11–12.
156.
Id.
157.
See id. at 26–27.
158.
See id. at 26–33.
159.
See, e.g., id. at 16–17 (describing PCN # 1 as “not subject to the CWA or RHA”).
160.
E.g., id. at 7, 13, 34.
161.
See id. at 11.
162.
Sierra Club, Inc. v. Bostick, 787 F.3d 1043, 1064–65 (10th Cir. 2015) (McHugh, J.,
concurring).
163.
See Standing Rock Sioux Tribe, 205 F. Supp. 3d at 35 (holding that unless the NWP
12 permit is being sought for dredge or fill activities federal jurisdiction to issue an injunction is not triggered).
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where the environmental consequences of the larger project are essentially products of the Corps permit action.
Typical factors to be considered in determining whether sufficient
‘control and responsibility’ exists include:
(i) Whether or not the regulated activity comprises ‘merely
a link’ in a corridor type project (e.g., a transportation or
utility transmission project).
(ii) Whether there are aspects of the upland facility in the
immediate vicinity of the regulated activity which affect
the location and configuration of the regulated activity.
(iii) The extent to which the entire project will be within
Corps jurisdiction.
(iv) The extent of cumulative Federal control and
responsibility.164
The D.D.C., interpreting Appendix C, concluded that USACE did not
have control and responsibility over the entire pipeline project.165 The
D.D.C. relied on other cases involving utility lines and Appendix B in order
to reach that conclusion.166 The court cited Sierra Club v. U.S. Army Corps
of Engineers, a D.C. Circuit opinion, affirming the D.D.C.’s decision that
issuing an NWP 12 for a 593-mile pipeline, requiring verifications for only
five percent of the pipeline and with water crossings constituting just 2.3
percent of the pipeline, did not require an entire project analysis.167 The
Sierra Club argued that the pipeline could not possibly be completed without USACE granting the permit, and that as a result, the project was within
USACE’s control and responsibility.168 The D.D.C. had disagreed, deeming that USACE could not have control and responsibility when such a
small percentage of the pipeline required federal permitting.169 The
D.D.C. saw the Standing Rock case similarly, finding that DAPL—a 1,172mile pipeline, requiring permitting for only three percent of its length and
with just one percent of its length within jurisdictional water crossings—did
not require enough federal permitting to put the entire project within
164.
33 C.F.R. pt. 325, app. B (7)(b)(2) (1990).
165.
Standing Rock Sioux Tribe, 205 F. Supp. 3d at 31. Appendix C is the sister appendix, providing the procedures under NHPA, to Appendix B, which provides the procedures
for the National Environmental Policy Act. 33 C.F.R. pt. 325, App. B, App. C (1990).
166.
Standing Rock Sioux Tribe, 205 F. Supp. 3d at 31.
167.
Id.; Sierra Club v. U.S. Army Corp of Eng’rs, 803 F.3d 31, 39, 50 (D.C. Cir.
2015).
168.
Sierra Club, 803 F.3d at 51.
169.
Id. at 42.
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USACE’s control and responsibility.170 The D.D.C. also cited Winnebago
Tribe of Nebraska v. Ray, where a permit was sought for construction of an
electric utility line.171 There, the Eighth Circuit found an entire project
analysis was not required because a significant portion of the line did not
require federal permitting.172 Again, the D.D.C. drew a connection between DAPL and the electric utility line because both involved projects
which required federal permitting for only a small percentage of their
lengths, and where the permitted portions were considered mere links.173
While D.D.C.’s interpretations of Sierra Club and Winnebago were reasonable, other interpretations would have been better supported. For example, while Sierra Club involved a pipeline, it is inapposite because it did not
involve an Indian tribe.174 This fact is crucial because of the additional
Section 106 duties that arise when a tribe is involved; those duties are designed to incorporate tribes’ expertise about cultural and historical resources.175 These additional duties were especially important in considering
Standing Rock’s motion because the Missouri River was just one of several
water crossings along DAPL’s route with significant cultural and historical
importance to the tribe.176
Although Winnebago involved a tribe,177 it is distinguishable from
Standing Rock’s case because its scope of analysis included a unique feature,
which the D.D.C. overlooked. In Winnebago, the plaintiffs were concerned
about the line’s potential effect on certain kinds of eagles that the tribe
revered.178 While the Winnebago court did not find that USACE needed to
review the effects of the entire line, it did consider whether an electric
current running through permitted portions of the line would have adverse
effects on the eagles.179 That approach resembles an “entire project analysis,” because running electricity or oil through a line only becomes a consideration if the line as a whole is under review. While Winnebago and the
Standing Rock case both considered portions of larger projects, only the
170.
Standing Rock Sioux Tribe, 205 F. Supp. 3d at 13, 31.
171.
Id. at 31.
172.
Winnebago Tribe of Nebraska v. Ray, 621 F.2d 269, 272–73 (8th Cir. 1980). The
section 10 permit sought in Winnebago would allow the 67-mile line to cross only 1.25 miles
of permit-required area. Id.
173.
Standing Rock Sioux Tribe, 205 F. Supp. 3d at 31.
174.
See Sierra Club, 803 F.3d 31.
175.
36 C.F.R. § 800.4(c)(1) (2016).
176.
Motion for Preliminary Injunction Request for Expedited Hearing, supra note 48,
at 8–9. One of the most contested locations was the confluence of the Cannon Ball and
Missouri Rivers, where there are perfectly rounded stones the tribe holds sacred. Id.
177.
Winnebago, 621 F.2d at 269.
178.
Id. at 274.
179.
Id.

R
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D.D.C. and USACE in Standing Rock’s case limited review to the consequences of construction of the portions.180 Winnebago was not supportive to
the D.D.C. because USACE review in Winnebago appropriately considered
the tribes’ interests, while USACE review for DAPL did not consider
Standing Rock’s interests.
Along with its incomplete interpretations of Sierra Club and Winnebago,
the D.D.C. also ignored reasonable, alternative interpretations of Appendix
B and C to part 325. Under Appendix B § 7(b)(1), the district engineer is
directed to establish scope based on what is in USACE’s “control and responsibility.”181 Appendix B § 7(b)(2) adds that USACE’s “control and responsibility” extends beyond the limits of USACE jurisdiction where Federal
involvement is sufficient to turn an essentially private action into a federal
action.182 In DAPL’s case, then, USACE had control and responsibility of
the whole project based on how indispensable permits were to the construction of DAPL. It is questionable, if not impossible, that the pipeline could
have been completed without the permits.183 And if the segments could not
have connected any other way, there would be no point in Dakota Access
LLC building segments of line in the 97 percent of space in between the
permit stretches.184 Because USACE’s approval was so crucial to DAPL’s
completion, Appendix B suggests that the district engineer should have extended review “beyond the limits of USACE jurisdiction.”185 This means
that USACE should have consulted Standing Rock about surveying nonpermit sites that could be affected, particularly ancestral lands where historical properties were likelier to be.
The fullest view of Appendix C similarly goes against the D.D.C.’s
reasoning because it mandates that the district engineer take into account
the effects of an undertaking on historic properties both within and beyond
jurisdictional waters.186 Additionally, where the undertaking may adversely
impact any National Historic Landmark, the district engineer is to condi180.
See Standing Rock Sioux Tribe v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 205 F. Supp. 3d 4
(D.D.C. 2016).
181.
33 C.F.R. pt. 325, app. B (7)(b)(1) (1990).
182.
Id.
183.
Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 15–16, Standing Rock Sioux
Tribe v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 205 F. Supp. 3d 4 (D.D.C. 2016) (No. 1:16-cv-01534),
2016 WL 4033936. The pipeline would have had to avoid over 200 sites where verifications
were required and would have had to gone around the end of the 2,341 mile Missouri River.
Id.
184.
Standing Rock Sioux Tribe, 205 F. Supp. 3d at 13 (stating that permitting was required for only three percent of DAPL’s length).
185.
See 33 C.F.R. pt. 325, app. B (7)(b)(1).
186.
Id. at app. C(2)(a).
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tion any permit to minimize harm to such landmark.187 Pye v. United States
interpreted this latter portion to apply to any historic sites, not only National Historic Landmarks.188 There, the Fourth Circuit found that
USACE had violated Appendix C by ignoring the effect of authorizing a
road to be built adjacent to an historic African-American cemetery, when
the cemetery was eligible for inclusion in the National Register.189
The important contrast between these interpretations of Appendix B
and Appendix C and the D.D.C.’s interpretations of them is that the
D.D.C.’s interpretations failed to account for USACE’s responsibility for adverse effects beyond its authority or jurisdiction; the D.D.C.’s interpretations focused solely on control.190 The D.D.C. gave an incomplete
representation of the regulations by conforming to USACE’s view that jurisdictional control is the sole determinant of control and responsibility.191
Finally, the D.D.C. failed to consider two other important cases—Save
our Sonoran, Inc. v. Flowers and White Tanks Concerned Citizens, Inc. v.
Strock—to interpret control and responsibility. Sonoran clarified the difference between authority and responsibility.192 As mentioned in discussing
Appendix B and Appendix C to part 325, the D.D.C. seemed unconcerned
about equating these two terms.193 In the D.D.C.’s view, USACE was not
required to conduct an entire project analysis given its limited authority.194
Sonoran shows that the regulations do not justify that logical leap. As Sonoran put it, “while it is the development’s impact on jurisdictional waters
that determines the scope of the Corps’ permitting authority, it is the impact
on the environment at large that determines the Corps’ NEPA responsibility.”195 Thus, USACE bore responsibility for the risks DAPL posed to the
environment or historic properties beyond the scope of its authority.
Here, DAPL did pose risks of harm to historical and environmental
resources beyond the permitting area. This is apparent from the travesty
already mentioned, where DAPL mowed over sacred tribal burial grounds
187.
Id.
188.
Pye v. United States, 269 F.3d 459, 470 (4th Cir. 2001) (holding plaintiff’s interests to be “within the zone of interests targeted by the National Historic Preservation Act”).
189.
Id. at 462, 470.
190.
Standing Rock Sioux Tribe v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 205 F. Supp. 3d 4,
30–31 (D.D.C. 2016); see id. at 23–24, 25.
191.
Id.
192.
Save Our Sonoran, Inc. v. Flowers, 408 F.3d 1113, 1122 (9th Cir. 2004).
193.
See Standing Rock Sioux Tribe, 205 F. Supp. 3d at 31.
194.
Id. at 32.
195.
Save Our Sonoran, 408 F.3d at 1122 (discussing Appendix C) (emphasis added).
For our purposes you could substitute “NHPA” for “NEPA,” and “impact on historical and
cultural resources” for “impact on the environment at large.”
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on ancestral lands.196 If USACE had fulfilled its duties according to Appendix B and Appendix C, it would have made avoiding those burial
grounds a condition for approving DAPL permits. But because USACE
focused its review solely on the exact jurisdictional bounds of the permits,
the agency was not performing due diligence and consulting tribes about
what historic properties could be beyond the permit area.
The second case the D.D.C. ignored, White Tanks Concerned Citizens,
Inc. v. Strock, explains USACE’s increased responsibility as it becomes
clearer that “a development could not go forward without a permit.”197
White Tanks’ interpretation of “control and responsibility” offers a more
comprehensive way to think about the Standing Rock case, where the permits for DAPL might be characterized as “mere links.”198 White Tanks
imagined the scope of review for any case as falling along a spectrum.199 At
one end of the spectrum are “capillary” scenarios, which existed in Sonoran
and White Tanks because the permitting was required for wetlands which
naturally spread the permit sites throughout the project area.200 On this
end of the spectrum, a project would be impossible without permitting.201
At the other end are mere “link” scenarios, where the permits are not essential to completion of the project, such that it would be easy to build around
the site where a permit is sought.202
DAPL falls closer to the capillary end of the White Tanks spectrum, as it
would have been practically impossible to build the pipeline around the end
of the 2,341-mile Missouri River,203 and to avoid over 200 water body cross196.
Alexander Sammon, A History of Native Americans Protesting the Dakota Access Pipeline, MOTHER JONES (Sept. 9, 2016), http://www.motherjones.com/environment/2016/09/dako
ta-access-pipeline-protest-timeline-sioux-standing-rock-jill-stein.
197.
White Tanks Concerned Citizens, Inc. v. Strock, 563 F.3d 1033, 1040 (9th Cir.
2009).
198.
33 C.F.R. pt. 325, app. B (7)(b)(2).
199.
White Tanks, 563 F.3d at 1040.
200.
Id.; see Save Our Sonoran, 408 F.3d at 1113.
201.
White Tanks, 563 F.3d at 1040.
202.
Id.
203.
Motion for Preliminary Injunction Request for Expedited Hearing, supra note 48,
at 8; Dakota Access LLC was well aware of this problem. Initially, DAPL was to cross the
Missouri near Bismarck, but after Bismarck residents voiced complaints about safety concerns, Energy Transfer Partners changed the pipeline’s route southward to pass the Missouri
River adjacent to the Standing Rock reservation. Catherine Thorbecke, Why a Previosuly
Proposed Route for the Dakota Access Pipeline was Rejected, ABC NEWS (Nov. 3, 2016), http://
abcnews.go.com/US/previously-proposed-route-dakota-access-pipeline-rejected/story?id=43
274356. Looking at a map, it is clear that the ravine is narrower next to Bismarck, which
means that less length of the pipeline would be running under the river if it crossed at the
point near Bismarck. Such instances of environmental racism against Natives are nothing
new. Omar Saleem, Overcoming Environmental Discrimination: The Need for a Disparate Impact

R
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ings which required verifications.204 Despite the fact that 97 percent of
DAPL was to be built on land beyond federal jurisdiction,205 it is nearly
certain that the pipeline could not have connected from the Bakken oil
fields in North Dakota to the refinery in Illinois without federal permitting.206 The water bodies DAPL crosses are scattered across the Midwestern terrain in a fashion that is more capillary-like than link-like on the White
Tanks spectrum. More importantly, the crossing at the Missouri River was
indispensable to completing the pipeline.207
On the other hand, this discussion of “authority” versus “responsibility”
could have been inconsequential if the D.D.C. were committed to deferring
to agency decision making.208 This framework would lead a court to be less
concerned about ensuring that agencies fulfill their duties to tribes, and the
Section 106 review process would be viewed as another instance of procedural duties which agencies have a wide amount of discretion in deciding how
to meet. On these terms, the D.D.C. was well positioned to defer to
USACE’s judgment, because doing so conformed with the increasingly deferential stance courts take toward agencies’ expertise.209 This watering
down of Section 106 duties may not be completely due to a disrespect for
tribes. Rather, it could reflect the courts’ commitment to deferring to
agencies.
Prioritizing agency deference is only a viable approach so long as the
alternative paradigm is ignored. The alternative paradigm refocuses judicial
review to acknowledge tribes as parties to whom the agency and the court
both owe deference. Put another way, the alternative paradigm is a reminder that Section 106 review is not just another example of congressionally delegated procedural requirements that the agency alone has vast
discretion to interpret and control. Under the alternative paradigm, Section 106 treats tribes as additional stakeholders with significant say, such
that the APA framework, on which the D.D.C. significantly relied,210 would
not always be appropriate to resolve Section 106 conflicts.
Test and Improved Notice Requirements in Facility Siting Decisions, 19 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 211,
221, 223 (1994).
204.
See Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, supra note 183, at 11.
205.
Supra note 184 and accompanying text.
206.
See Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, supra note 183.
207.
Motion for Preliminary Injunction Request for Expedited Hearing, supra note 48,
at 8.
208.
Standing Rock Sioux Tribe v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 205 F. Supp. 3d at
30–32 (D.D.C. Sept. 9, 2016).
209.
JAMES T. O’REILLY, ADMINISTRATIVE RULEMAKING: STRUCTURING, OPPOSING, AND DEFENDING FEDERAL REGULATIONS § 18.2 (2d ed. 2016).
210.
Standing Rock Sioux Tribe, 205 F. Supp. 3d at 30.

R
R
R
R
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B. Standing Rock’s Brief with the Alternative Paradigm
The Standing Rock tribe litigators could have made arguments with a
stronger emphasis on law falling under the alternative paradigm. While
they did make mention of some of that law, they failed to elaborate on the
specific demands of those pieces of law and show how USACE failed to
meet them. Instead, they focused solely on consultation. While it is good
to highlight consultation duties, without alternative paradigm concepts,
USACE’s argument was nearly equally as strong as Standing Rock’s on the
question of adequate consultation, because this concept has become nothing
more than a pro forma checkbox. Before deferring to the agency, the
D.D.C. found that it only needed to confirm that USACE had checked the
consultation box. This section discusses how emphasizing alternative paradigm provisions would have weighed in Standing Rock’s favor.
Primary sources of the alternative paradigm include:
1) NHPA Section 106 regulations requiring agencies to “seek concurrence” and giving tribes the right to be MOA signatories, and
2) The government-to-government relationship and NHPA Section 106 and case law applications of the relationship in substantive
form.211
Neither the D.D.C.’s opinion nor Standing Rock’s motion for preliminary injunction mentioned the “seek concurrence” provision.212 This provision is valuable to the goal of NHPA Section 106 under the alternative
paradigm—respecting tribes’ active role in the identification and review of
historic sites.213
The D.D.C. and Standing Rock counsel also failed to highlight the
independent value of the government-to-government relationship.214 Properly administered, NHPA Section 106 review recognizes both higher-quality procedural review and substantive differences in review triggered in
response to the government-to-government relationship.215 But the
D.D.C.’s opinion ignored these provisions, and instead analyzed NHPA
Section 106 as another case of procedural-level review, without recognizing
211.
See supra Part II.A-B.
212.
See Standing Rock Sioux Tribe, 205 F. Supp. 3d 4; see also Motion for Preliminary
Injunction Request for Expedited Hearing, supra note 48.
213.
See supra Part II.A.
214.
See Standing Rock Sioux Tribe, 205 F. Supp. 3d 4; see also Motion for Preliminary
Injunction Request for Expedited Hearing, supra note 48.
215.
See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 13,175, § 3(b)–(c), 65 Fed. Reg. 67,249 (Nov. 6, 2000)
(instructing agencies to give tribes administrative power and deference where appropriate);
36 C.F.R. § 800.2(c) (2016).

R
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the unique obligations to tribes Section 106 creates.216 For example, the
D.D.C. said it could not “conclude that the Corps does not have the ability
to promulgate these general permits at all. As a result, the Corps’ effort to
speak with those it thought might be concerned was sufficient to discharge
its NHPA obligations.”217 This quote is one of many218 in the opinion that
is so revealing because it shows that USACE and the D.D.C. viewed tribes
as no more than some of “those [USACE] thought might be concerned,”—in
other words, as just another interest group.
This quote from the D.D.C.’s opinion is also interesting because it
closely precedes a reference to 36 C.F.R. § 800.4(b)(1).219 That provision
discusses the added level of effort USACE is expected to put forth in identifying historic properties.220 The D.D.C. focused on Section 800.4 as a
reason to defer to the agency,221 but Section 800.4 actually concerns the
THPO, tribes, and special duties owed to them.222 In particular, Section 800.4 lays out requirements for involving tribes in identifying properties of cultural or historic significance.223 Given the regulation’s deference
to tribes, the D.D.C.’s citation of it to support agency deference was misleading. The fullest reading of Section 800.4 suggests a goal of assigning
active roles to the THPO and tribes in identifying cultural and historic
properties.224 The regulation creates greater procedural and substantive duties that align with the government-to-government relationship enjoyed by
tribes, unique among interest groups.225
216.
See Standing Rock Sioux Tribe, 205 F. Supp. 3d 4.
217.
Id. at 28.
218.
Another, for example, concerned programmatic agreements, which the regulations
say tribes are supposed to play a crucial role in: “There is, indeed, no indication that such a
requirement would even be feasible for a nationwide permitting scheme given the sheer
number of possible consulting parties.” Id. at 29.
219.
See id. at 33.
220.
36 C.F.R. § 800.4(b)(1).
221.
See Standing Rock Sioux Tribe, 205 F. Supp. 3d at 33.
222.
See 36 C.F.R. § 800.4(b)(1).
223.
See id. § 800.4.
224.
Just before the provision the court cites, Section 800.4(a)(4) says that the agency
shall “[g]ather information from any Indian tribe or Native Hawaiian organization identified
pursuant to § 800.3(f) to assist in identifying properties, including those located off tribal
lands, which may be of religious and cultural significance to them and may be eligible for the
National Register.” Id. § 800.4(a)(4). Later in the section, Section 800.4(c)(1) instructs that
“[t]he agency official shall acknowledge that Indian tribes and Native Hawaiian organizations
possess special expertise in assessing the eligibility of historic properties that may possess
religious and cultural significance to them.” Id. § 800.4(c)(1). Section 800.4(c)(2) goes even
further, saying that the THPO’s opinion on whether a property is eligible or ineligible has
decisive power, and that a tribe disagreeing with a determination may request that ACHP
instruct the agency official to obtain a determination of eligibility. Id. § 800.4(c)(2).
225.
See 36 C.F.R. § 800.4.

\\jciprod01\productn\M\MEA\6-2\MEA204.txt

516

unknown

Seq: 32

Michigan Journal of Environmental & Administrative Law

11-JUL-17

14:04

[Vol. 6:2

Standing Rock’s litigators did not sufficiently highlight Section 800.4’s
empowering aspects or even its ties to the government-to-government relationship.226 Because of this, their arguments about the importance of Section 800.4’s provisions favoring tribes fell flat when compared to the
regulation’s agency-deferential provisions.227 The only time Standing Rock
litigators presented Section 800.4’s empowering aspects was by quoting
Quechan Tribe, and even then, the quote it used was did not directly address
the power tribes have in the review process.228 In its complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief, Standing Rock litigators used the phrase “government-to-government” just once, and weakened its impact by mentioning
that the regulations set duties to the public.229 Besides failing to tie the
government-to-government concept to substantive provisions, this context
of public duties erased the unique obligations owed tribes among other
stakeholders. While counsel included “government-to-government” more
often in its motion for preliminary injunction, its references were vague and
only observed “government-to-government” in quotes or parentheticals
about other cases, rather than taking ownership of the phrase for Standing
Rock’s argument.230 Finally, Standing Rock litigators left out any mention
of “government-to-government” in its Emergency Motion for Injunction
Pending Appeal.231
Both the D.D.C. and Standing Rock litigators ignored Quechan Tribe to
establish government-to-government relationship duties. The D.D.C. mentioned Quechan Tribe just twice, toward the end of the opinion, without
mention of the phrase “government-to-government.”232 Even those refer226.
See Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, supra note 183, at 8–9; see also
Motion for Preliminary Injunction Request for Expedited Hearing, supra note 48, at 4, 25,
33.
227.
See Standing Rock Sioux Tribe v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 205 F. Supp. 3d 4,
49–50 (D.D.C. 2016).
228.
Motion for Preliminary Injunction Request for Expedited Hearing, supra note 48,
at 31. The motion discusses how Quechan Tribe characterized tribes’ views as being owed
“special consideration” Id. It also illustrates that Section 800.4 “alone requires at least seven
issues about which the Tribe as a consulting party, is entitled to be consulted before the
project was approved.” Id. As mentioned earlier, however, Quechan Tribe applied the government-to-government relationship in its reasoning so thoroughly that tying it as a theme to all
of the regulations would have increased the value of consultation. See supra Part II.B.3.
229.
Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, supra note 183, at 33.
230.
See id. at 11, 13, 22, 25. But see id. at 32 (providing an argument closer to harnessing
“government-to-government”).
231.
See Emergency Motion for Injunction Pending Appeal, Standing Rock Sioux Tribe
v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 205 F. Supp. 3d 4 (D.D.C. 2016) (No. 16-5259); Motion for
Preliminary Injunction Request for Expedited Hearing, supra note 48.
232.
Standing Rock Sioux Tribe, 205 F. Supp. 3d at 32–33. It is also worth noting that
the court mentioned the phrase “government-to-government” just four times throughout the
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ences to Quechan Tribe seemed designed to discredit its value, which the
D.D.C. may have found necessary because Standing Rock counsel so heavily referenced the case (for purposes other than to establish the government-to-government relationship) in its motions and briefs.233 Standing
Rock attorneys made no mention of Quechan Tribe in their Complaint, but
mentioned the case sparsely in their Emergency Motion for Injunction
Pending Appeal, and throughout their memo in support of the Expedited
Hearing Request.234 In the Emergency Motion for Injunction, counsel’s
most powerful argument touched upon empowering tribes, though it did
not use the phrase “government-to-government.”235 Instead, counsel quoted
Quechan Tribe to highlight the special roles of tribes as sovereigns in the
preservation of historic properties.236 This was a step in the right direction,
but was not used enough to establish a strong theme of government-togovernment obligations. Counsel’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction primarily relied on Quechan Tribe to affirm consultation and to establish that
DAPL posed irreparable harm.237 The case would have carried more weight
if Quechan Tribe had been referenced to evidence the power of tribes
through the government-to-government relationship, rather than casting
them as victims owed mere consultation.
Counsel failed to argue that Section 106 empowers tribes, which would
have rebutted agency deference. USACE practices pro forma tribal consultation, which does not achieve meaningful consultation as Section 106 intends: consultation that reflects the government-to-government
relationship. An argument under the alternative paradigm would have
pushed for greater procedural responsibility from USACE, as well as increased substantive rights of Standing Rock.
The D.D.C. clearly did not find Section 106 to require much procedural rigor:
[N]either the NHPA nor the Advisory Council regulations require
that any cultural surveys be conducted for a federal undertaking.
whole opinion, twice in the context of relaying the account of USACE’s failure to engage in
a government-to-government relationship, and twice to take note of USACE’s lip-service. Id.
at 9, 19, 20, 28.
233.
See Standing Rock Sioux Tribe, 205 F. Supp. 3d 4; see also Motion for Preliminary
Injunction Request for Expedited Hearing, supra note 48; Emergency Motion for Injunction
Pending Appeal, supra note 231.
234.
Emergency Motion for Injunction Pending Appeal, supra note 231, at 15, 19, 20;
Motion for Preliminary Injunction Request for Expedited Hearing, supra note 48.
235.
Emergency Motion for Injunction Pending Appeal, supra note 231, at 19–20.
236.
Id.
237.
See Motion for Preliminary Injunction Request for Expedited Hearing, supra note
48.
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The regulations instead demand only that the Corps make a “reasonable and good faith effort” to consult on identifying cultural
properties, which “may include background research, consultation,
oral history interviews, sample field investigations, and field
surveys.” 36 C.F.R. § 800.4(b)(1). It goes without saying that
‘may’ means may.238
Again, Section 800.4 suggests it involves significant tribal involvement in
the identification process.239 While the D.D.C. may have been correct that
a “good faith effort” does not need to include all of the due diligence measures listed in Section 800.4(b)(1), the regulation cannot dispense with
soliciting tribes and taking seriously their views about how to best identify
historic properties.240
The broad wording and generous preference for tribes throughout
NHPA Section 106 presents ample opportunity to apply the alternative paradigm, which should have occurred in Standing Rock’s case.241 By preferring agency deference, the D.D.C. disregarded the long-standing Indian law
canons of construction, which mandate that treaties and statutes be interpreted in favor of tribes.242 By ignoring this interpretative approach, the
D.D.C. read Section 106 review to regard tribes as deserving no more respect and roles than any other interest group.

C. Implementing the Alternative Paradigm
Many actors must work together for the alternative paradigm to be implemented. First, agencies must reformulate or revitalize their policies to
empower tribes. They should focus in particular on policies recognizing the
government-to-government relationship. Understanding what duties are
owed tribes has not been consistent across agencies; agencies with more
robust policies should lead the way.243 Oversight agencies, like ACHP,
should press for greater compliance with best practices. Second, tribes and
advocates should incorporate alternative paradigm concepts whenever possi238.
Standing Rock Sioux Tribe, 205 F. Supp. 3d at 33 (quotations omitted).
239.
See 36 C.F.R. § 800.4 (2016).
240.
See id. § 800.4(b)(1) (the last two sentences assert that tribal views should be considered in identification and for any confidentiality concerns a tribe may have).
241.
See, e.g., id.
242.
Jacob Schuman, Indian Canon Originalism, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1100, 1100–01 (2013).
243.
EPA’s policies tend to be more robust, for example, EPA’s document on consultation with tribes encourages relying on treaties, while USACE’s policies tend to be less robust, or fail to take tribes into account at all. Compare EPA, EPA POLICY ON CONSULTATION AND
COORDINATION WITH INDIAN TRIBES (2011), https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/201308/documents/cons-and-coord-with-indian-tribes-policy.pdf, with U.S. ARMY CORPS OF
ENG’RS, supra note 83.
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ble, in order to empower tribes and reaffirm their rights to “seek concurrence,” serve as signatories to MOAs, and engage in meaningful
government-to-government relations. Finally, litigators need to embrace
alternative paradigm concepts as substantive provisions of law, in order to
appreciate that tribes are entitled to greater participation and owed greater
deference than other interest groups in Section 106 review.

1. Agencies
Although CEQ and ACHP regulations advise agencies on how to engage in government-to-government relations and meaningfully consult
tribes, those agencies must establish their own policies.244 It is worth reviewing existing agency policies, both to identify best practices and note
room for improvement.
First, agencies should recognize the difference between consultation
and government-to-government obligations. Meaningful consultation is a
necessary piece of government-to-government obligations, but it is not the
entire picture. The Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA), distinguished these
concepts helpfully in a 2000 memorandum: “it is through [the governmentto-government] relationship,” that the duty to consult arises.245 Once the
distinction between the two concepts is recognized, tribal consultation itself
gains significance, and a larger picture of duties owed tribes emerges. The
BIA memo reflected this as well, defining consultation as “a process of government-to-government dialogue between the Bureau of Indian Affairs and
Indian tribes regarding proposed Federal actions in a manner intended to
secure meaningful and timely tribal input.”246 The memo provides some
examples of how this goal can be accomplished.247 The memo’s advice on
tribal consultation characterizes the process as more than the notice and
comment process that other interest groups engage in.248 This picture of
tribal consultation is at odds with the view conveyed in a USACE document
on the permitting process, which affords tribes only de minimis mention and
limits tribal participation to having the opportunity to “review and
comment.”249
244.
40 C.F.R. § 1507.3; Memorandum on Government-to-Government Relations with
Native American Tribal Governments, 59 Fed. Reg. 22,951 (Apr. 29, 1994).
245.
Memorandum from Kevin Gover, Assistant Sec’y of Indian Affairs, Bureau of Indian Affairs Government-to-Government Consultation Policy § 1 (Dec. 13, 2000), https://
www.bia.gov/cs/groups/public/documents/text/idc-002000.pdf.
246.
Id. § 4.
247.
See id.
248.
Id.
249.
See U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENG’RS, supra note 83.
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Government-to-government obligations must not be limited to consultation; the current, weak view of consultation is a result of agencies’ failure
to see relations beyond it. A recent article by Robinson Meyer demonstrates that failing to distinguish consultation and government-to-government relations results in a reduced importance and value of the latter.250
Meyer, claiming to convey the “legal case” for Standing Rock, treats consultation and government-to-government relations as equivalent:
Crucially, as well, federal agencies must approve projects in a “government-to-government” way. A local tribe is not supposed to be
hustled in at the end for a rubber stamp, but included throughout
the process as a collaborative body. It is this right—the right to be
consulted—that the Standing Rock Sioux and their legal team assert
was infringed.251
If the government-to-government concept is to be of value, it needs to be
distinguished from tribal consultation.
Executive agencies are likely the most effective avenues for reaffirming
government-to-government practices, because each agency has a mandate to
effectuate government-to-government relations.252 An EPA guidance document exemplifies this by encouraging agency reliance on treaties during
tribal consultations.253 Relying on treaties recognizes that the present government-to-government relationship is a continuation of a government-togovernment relationship that has existed from the earliest contacts with
tribes, and also provides firmer ground for deferring to tribes as governments, in accordance with the Indian Hard Look Doctrine.254 Additionally,
ACHP advises agencies to rely on the special expertise of tribes to identify
historic properties of religious and cultural significance.255
To account for the possibility of agencies giving mere lip service to
government-to-government relations, or failure to be consistent across practices, oversight agencies should seek to enforce greater consistency of poli250.
Robinson Meyer, The Legal Case for Blocking the Dakota Access Pipeline, THE ATLANTIC
(Sept. 9, 2016), https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2016/09/dapl-dakota-sitting-rock-sioux/499178/.
251.
Id.
252.
40 CFR § 1507.3; Memorandum on Government-to-Government Relations with
Native American Tribal Governments, 59 Fed. Reg. 22,951 (Apr. 29, 1994).
253.
EPA, EPA POLICY ON CONSULTATION AND COORDINATION WITH INDIAN TRIBES: GUIDANCE
FOR DISCUSSING TRIBAL TREATY RIGHTS 3, 6 (2011), https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/
2016-02/documents/tribal_treaty_rights_guidance_for_discussing_tribal_treaty_rights.pdf.
254.
Choctaw Nation of Indians v. United States, 318 U.S. 423, 431–432 (1942).
255.
Advisory Council on Historic Pres., Consulting with Indian Tribes in the Section 106
Review Process, WORKING WITH SECTION 106, http://www.achp.gov/regs-tribes.html (last updated Aug 22, 2005).
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cies within and between agencies and departments. For NEPA, this
oversight role is assigned to CEQ in the field of environmental protection.256 NHPA delegates oversight to ACHP in the area of historic preservation.257 Oversight bodies should aim to ensure that their constituent
agencies apply best practices. For example, USACE’s “Tribal Nations Program” attempts to implement that agency’s own procedures for complying
with government-to-government relations. Unfortunately, that policy is
not as robust as those of other departments and agencies,258 and the
USACE’s compliance with its own program is inconsistent at best.259

2. Tribes and Advocates
Tribes and advocates should seek to affirm tribes’ rights as sovereigns,
and use some of the alternative paradigm sources identified in this Note to
pursue that end. These sources include the tribal prerogative to be signatory to MOAs, and to demand that agencies “seek concurrence” when tribes
disagree with findings about adverse effects.260 For institutional support,
tribes should recognize their ability to bring in ACHP as a consultation
party.261 ACHP could, for example, deter other agencies from abusing
their Section 106 review discretion.262 ACHP began to take on this role in
the Standing Rock case, but may have acted too late in the process to make
a difference, or may have lacked appreciation for tribes’ rights beyond
consultation.263

3. Litigators and Courts
As illustrated above, Standing Rock’s counsel could have better highlighted alternative paradigm concepts, and the D.D.C. should have acknowledged them.264 In every Section 106 case involving tribes, litigators
should begin with the premise that tribes have significant roles to play in
the identification and decision-making process, and that this is because of
their sovereignty and expertise in identifying culturally and historically sig256.
40 C.F.R. § 1500.1 (2016).
257.
See 54 U.S.C. § 306108 (2012).
258.
See, e.g., Standing Rock Sioux Tribe v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 205 F. Supp.
3d 4, 23–24 (D.D.C. 2016) (discussing the ACHP’s “skepticism” with the Corp’s determination and consulting process).
259.
Id.
260.
See supra Part II.A.
261.
Advisory Council on Historic Pres., Section 106 Regulations: Section-by-Section Questions and Answers, WORKING WITH SECTION 106, http://www.achp.gov/106q&a.html#800.6 (last
updated Aug. 30, 2013).
262.
Id.
263.
See Standing Rock Sioux Tribe, 205 F. Supp. 3d at 23–24.
264.
See supra Part III.B.
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nificant properties. Between these principles and the Indian law canons of
construction, the alternative paradigm appears to be the correct understanding of the law.

IV. CONCLUSION
The Standing Rock case clearly demonstrates how consultation, as currently conducted, does not adequately protect tribal interests. Although
some have assumed that a consent-based standard presents the only reasonable alternative, this Note identifies existing, enforceable sources of U.S. law
that could improve agency accountability to tribes. These alternative provisions have not been as widely discussed as consultation—but if they were
enforced, they would strengthen agencies’ obligations to tribes.

